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We pay central bankers to be paranoid. One of their primary responsi-
bilities is to do extensive contingency planning, preparing for every pos-
sible calamity. And when they do their job well, most of us don’t even no-
tice. In the past decade, there are numerous examples of the central bank
actions that were taken in response to an increase in the probability of dis-
aster. These include the Federal Open Market Committee’s interest rate re-
ductions in the fall of 1998 that followed the Russian government’s bond
default, the preparations for the century date change, the enormous liq-
uidity injections in the immediate aftermath of the September 11, 2001 ter-
rorist attacks in the United States, as well as the discussions that occurred
as nominal interest rates and inﬂation approached zero simultaneously. All
of these episodes demonstrate policymakers’ willingness to take actions in
order to reduce the chance of disaster, acting as the risk mangers for the
economic and ﬁnancial system.
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ity of achieving its goals is driven, I believe, to a risk-management ap-
proach to policy. By this I mean that policymakers need to consider not
only the most likely future path for the economy but also the distribution
of possible outcomes about that path” (Greenspan 2003, 3). Importantly,
the common practice of risk management requires controlling the proba-
bility of catastrophe. For a ﬁnancial intermediary, the focus is on reducing
the risk of signiﬁcant monetary loss. For a central banker, it means acting
to reduce the chances that output or the price level will be substantially be-
low trend.
To control risk in ﬁnancial institutions, risk managers employ the con-
cept of value-at-risk (VaR). Value-at-risk measures the worst possible loss
over a speciﬁc time horizon, at a given probability.1 A commercial bank
might say that the daily VaR for a trader controlling $100 million is $10
million at a 0.1 percent probability. That means that, given the historical
data used in the bank’s models, the trader cannot take a position that has
more than one chance in 1,000 of losing 10 percent in one day.
In some circumstances, VaR is all you need. For example, if it is being
used to measure the probability of institutional insolvency, it doesn’t really
matter how insolvent you are. But policymakers care not only about VaR,
they are also concerned about the expected loss given that an event is in the
lower tail—something called the expected tail loss (ETL). That is, not only
where the 5th or 10th percentile of the distribution of gross domestic prod-
uct (GDP) outcomes falls, but the expected value conditional on being in
the lowest 5th or 10th percentile.
Risk-management measures like VaR and ETL are computed from the
lower tail of the distribution of possible outcomes, examining the worst
events that could occur. This requires moving beyond simple quadratic
measures of risk like variance or standard deviation. It is fairly easy to
imagine circumstances where the worst possible events have become worse,
but the standard deviation of the distribution of all the possibilities is the
same. This is one view of the case in the fall of 1998. The point forecasts for
the aggregate price level and the GDP gap, and their standard deviation
stayed roughly the same. But the lower tail shifted—the probability and
size of a very bad outcome—rose. Policymakers acted in response to the
perception that the GDP at risk and ETL had gone up.2
A risk-management approach comes naturally to central bankers. It is
the basis for the creation and maintenance of the lender of last resort: the
policy of providing loans to private ﬁnancial intermediaries that are illiq-
uid but not insolvent helps to ensure that the payments system continues
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1. See Jorion (2001).
2. Formally, this means that the central bank’s loss function is not quadratic. For a recent
discussion, see Surico (forthcoming).to operate smoothly. Together with deposit insurance, central bank lend-
ing is designed to reduce the probability of bank runs to a negligible level.
(The implementation of prudential regulation and supervision is the re-
sponse to the moral hazard created by these policies.)
All of this makes it surprising that many central bankers are hesitant to
address the potential risks created by asset price booms and crashes—
what are commonly referred to as bubbles. The evidence is not in dispute.
Bubbles increase the volatility of growth and inﬂation and threaten the sta-
bility of the ﬁnancial system. The 2003 IMF World Economic Outlook esti-
mates that the average equity price bust lasts for 2.5 years and is associated
with a 4 percent GDP loss that aﬀects both consumption and investment.
While less frequent, property (or housing) busts are twice as long and are
associated with output losses that are twice as large.3
Asset price bubbles distort decisions throughout the economy. Wealth
eﬀects cause consumption to expand rapidly and then collapse. Increases
in equity prices make it easier for ﬁrms to ﬁnance new projects, causing in-
vestment to boom and then bust. The collateral used to back loans is over-
valued, so when prices collapse, it impairs the balance sheets of ﬁnancial
intermediaries that did the lending. It is the job of central bankers to elim-
inate the sort of economic distress caused by asset price bubbles. Although
the rhetoric has been changing slowly, especially in the case of the re-
sponses to Australian and British housing market booms several years ago,
most monetary policymakers remain reluctant to act directly to manage
these risks.
Any discussion of bubbles must distinguish between equity and property
prices. This is true for several reasons. First, the eﬃcient markets hypothe-
sis is more likely to apply to equity than to property. Arbitrage in stocks,
which requires the ability to short sell, is at least possible. In housing and
property, it is not. Second, even in the few countries with sizeable equity
markets, ownership tends to be highly concentrated among the wealthy—
people whose consumption decisions are well insulated from the vicissi-
tudes of the stock market. By contrast, home ownership is spread much
further down the income and wealth distribution. Finally, in many coun-
tries, housing purchases are highly leveraged, leaving the balance sheets of
both households and ﬁnancial intermediaries exposed to large price de-
clines. This suggests that the macroeconomic impact of a boom and crash
cycle in property prices might be larger in countries that have more credit
outstanding.4
In this chapter, I examine equity and housing price booms and crashes
from a risk management perspective. Using equity price data from twenty-
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3. See the excellent essays in Chapter II of IMF (2003) for a summary of the evidence.
4. For a somewhat more detailed discussion of the issues and the debate, see Cecchetti
(2003).seven countries and housing price data from seventeen countries, I will
look at the various consequences of rising equity and housing prices for
growth and inﬂation. I begin by examining how asset price booms inﬂu-
ence the mean and variance of deviations in (log) output and (log) price
level from their (time-varying) trends. I then proceed to measure both the
GDP at risk and the price level at risk that these booms create.
The scarcity of booms and crashes, especially in property prices, means
that I must pool data across countries. From what data there are, I come to
the following conclusions: housing booms are bad in virtually every way
imaginable; they drive the output gap down, increase its volatility, increase
GDP at risk, and push the lower tail of outcomes (ETL) even lower (de-
creasing the expected value of the GDP gap conditional on being in the
lower tail of the distribution). By contrast, equity booms have little impact
on either the level or volatility of the output and price-level gaps at horizons
of three years; do not change GDP at risk, but increase the risk of prices
falling dramatically below trend; and drive the lower tail (ETL) even lower.
Before continuing, it is worth noting the relationship between the use of
risk management and robust control in the context of monetary policy. Ro-
bust control examines policy making in the presence of model uncertainty.5
Instead of choosing optimal policy based on the most likely economic
model, it ignores the probability that any particular model of the economy
is true and selects the policy that delivers the best result even when the
worst model is true. That is, it computes the policy path or instrument rule
that minimizes the maximum loss, regardless of how likely or unlikely that
case might be. As Onatski and Stock (2002) show, in contrast to the stan-
dard case in which uncertainty breeds caution, this has the potential to
yield aggressive policy responses—aggressive enough to ensure that the
worst outcomes are avoided.6
While the risk management and robust-control approaches to policy
making both go beyond simple quadratic measures of loss, they are quite
diﬀerent. Rather than focusing on model uncertainty ignoring the proba-
bility of particular cases, concepts like VaR and ETL are designed to help
control both the size and likelihood of bad outcomes. In the case of asset
price booms, that means ﬁrst computing the probability distribution asso-
ciated with growth and inﬂation outcomes conditional on seeing equity or
property prices rise suddenly and then looking for ways in which policy-
makers can mitigate the worst possible outcome.
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5. See Svensson (2007) and Dennis, Leitemo, and Söderström (2006) for discussions.
6. The simplest example involves the case of inﬂation control. Imagine that policymakers are
unsure whether inﬂation follows a random walk or not—the largest root of the autoregressive
representation of the inﬂation rate is estimated to be less than one, but there is some ﬁnite prob-
ability that it actually equals one. Because it is the worst possible, the robust control solution
is for policymakers to react to shocks as if inﬂation were nonstationary. In most environments,
that means aggressively countering virtually anything that would force inﬂation up.The remainder of this chapter proceeds as follows. Section 1.2 provides
overwhelming evidence that the distribution of output and price-level de-
viations from their trends have fat tails, implying that methods based on
quadratic loss and normal approximations could be misleading. Then, in
section 1.3, I characterize the distribution of output and price-level condi-
tional on housing and equity booms. That is, I look at the mean, variance,
value-at-risk, and expected lower tail of output and price level conditional
on asset price booms. Overall, the results suggest that normal approxima-
tions are inadequate. Section 1.4 expands the discussion contrasting hous-
ing and equity booms.
There is a growing consensus that traditional interest rate policy is not
very useful in the battle to combat the deleterious macroeconomic eﬀects
of asset price bubbles.7 At the same time, it is clear that policymakers can-
not ignore the threat that equity and housing booms and busts pose for
central bankers’ stabilization goals. Adopting a risk management perspec-
tive means asking whether there are institutional solutions to the problem.
That is, are there ways to structure the ﬁnancial system that will then inoc-
ulate the real economy from the adverse eﬀects of bubbles? With this ques-
tion in mind, I examine the relative impact of asset price booms in econ-
omies with market- versus bank-based ﬁnancial systems. The results,
reported in section 1.5, suggest that market-based systems have a some-
what higher GDP at risk in the aftermath of equity booms, but those sys-
tems weather housing booms equally poorly.
1.2 GDP and Prices: General Considerations
Financial economists employ concepts like value-at-risk in order to ad-
dress the problems created by fat tails. That is, cases in which a normal
(Gaussian) distribution provides an overly optimistic picture of the likeli-
hood of extreme events. Equity returns are notorious for exhibiting high
probabilities of extreme events in their lower tail. Because these “bad” out-
comes are so important for controlling the risk of large losses, modeling
them has attracted substantial attention.8
Aggregate output and prices share some of the properties exhibited by
equity returns. The distribution of deviations of (log) output and the (log)
price level from their respective trend exhibit fat tails. That is, the proba-
bility of observing a large negative realization is substantially higher than
one would infer from a Gaussian distribution. To see this, I have calculated
the 5th percentile of the distribution of log output and log price-level devi-
ations from their Hodrick-Prescott (Hodrick and Prescott 1997) trends,
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7. See Cecchetti (2006) for a discussion.
8. See LeBaron and Samanta (2005) for a discussion of the issues surrounding modeling fat-
tailed distributions.with smoothing parameter set to 1,600, for a series of countries using quar-
terly data from 1970 to 2003.9 These results are plotted in ﬁgures 1.1 and
1.2. (The appendix provides a more detailed description of the data.) The
ﬁgures also include results for a Jacque-Bera test for normality—these 
are the ∗s next to the country names. Normality is rejected for eleven of 
seventeen cases using the output gap and ten of seventeen using the price-
level gap.
The ﬁgures show the results for the following calculation. For the nor-
mal distribution, this is just 1.645 times the standard deviation of the series.
The alternative, which takes the fatness of the tails of the distribution into
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9. I have also computed results for a shorter sample beginning in 1985 that verify the inac-
curacies of the normal approximation reported in the following. In addition, the results
throughout the chapter are robust to using a smoothing parameter of 9,600, rather than 1,600;
to using the residuals from a four-order autoregression; and to using the residuals from the
estimation of a two-equation aggregate demand—aggregate supply model based on Rude-
busch and Svensson (1999) as implemented in Cecchetti, Flores-Lagunes, and Krause (2006)
that includes interest rates.
Fig. 1.1 GDP at risk, normal versus t-distribution approximation. GDP at risk:
Normal versus fat-tailed
Notes: The ∗s refer to the signiﬁcance level of the Jacque-Bera test for normality. A single ∗ is
for countries with a p-value of 0.10 or less, while ∗∗ signiﬁes a p-value of 0.05 or less. The test
statistic equals (n/6)[ 2
3   ( 4 – 3)/4], where  3 and  4 are the sample third and fourth mo-
ments, and n is the sample size. The statistic is distributed as  -squared with 2 degrees of free-
dom. Test results are reported for the deviations of quarterly log GDP and log prices from a
Hodrick-Prescott ﬁltered trend with parameter equal to 1,600. The sample is from 1970 to
2003.account, begins by the computation of a Hill index. As described in
LeBaron and Samanta (2005), the Hill index is an estimate of the number
of moments of a distribution that exists. For a normal distribution, the in-
dex is inﬁnity. After computing the index, the tail is approximately distrib-
uted as a Student t with degrees of freedom equal to the Hill index value.
So the t-distribution approximation to the 5th percentile of the deviations
of log GDP or the log price level from their trend is equal to the standard
deviation of the series times the 5 percent level of the t-distribution with de-
grees of freedom equal to the series’ Hill index.10
As one would expect, in some countries the deviations of output and
prices from trend—their output and price-level gaps—have fatter tails
than others. But if one were to use the normal distribution, the errors
would be large—averaging roughly 50 percent. For the United States, the
5th percentile of the normal distribution implies a deviation of output
from trend of slightly more than –2.5 percent. Taking the fatness of the
lower tail of the actual data into account yields an estimate of more than
4.5 percent. That is, the 5 percent GDP at risk for the United States (with-
out conditioning on anything). For the price level, the estimates diverge by
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10. Computation of the Hill index requires a decision about where the tail of the distribu-
tion starts. I take LeBaron and Samanta’s (2005) advice and use the bottom 10 percent of the
observations.
Fig. 1.2 Price level at risk, normal versus t-distribution approximation. Price level
at risk: Normal versus fat-tailed
Note: See explanatory note for ﬁgure 1.1.less with the normal distribution, giving a 5 percent price-level at risk equal
to –2.5 percent and the t-distribution approximation yielding an estimate
of –3.5 percent.
It is important to keep in mind that standard statistical and economet-
ric procedures are designed to characterize behavior near the mean of the
data, so they are particularly ill-suited to the examination of tail events.
This means that when extreme events are more likely than the normal dis-
tribution implies, and we care about them, it is important to adopt tech-
niques that explicitly account for fat tails.
1.3 Risks Created by Asset Price Bubbles
Managing risk means having information about the entire distribution of
possible outcomes. That is, one needs to know not only the mean and vari-
ance, but tail probabilities as well. With that in mind, I now compute the
mean, variance, value-at-risk, and expected lower tail for output and price-
level deviations from their trends, all conditional on the asset price booms.
1.3.1 The Mean
How do asset price booms change the mean and volatility of output and
price-level gaps? I examine this question using a series of regression, which
allow straightforward statistical inference. Throughout this exercise, I
treat asset price booms and busts as events that are exogenous with respect
to the behavior of output and price paths several years into the future.11
To study the conditional mean, consider the following regression:
(1) xit   a   bdit–k( )   εit,
where xit is the level of the output (or price-level) gap; dit–k( ) is a dummy
variable that takes on the value 1 if k periods earlier the ﬁltered asset price
data exceeds the threshold  . The coeﬃcient b measures the impact of the
asset price boom on the distribution of the gap variable.
Before continuing, let me pause to describe the procedure used to con-
struct the data.12 First, for each country, I take the deviation of the log of
each series—real GDP, the aggregate price level, the real equity price in-
dex, and the real housing price index—from its Hodrick-Prescott ﬁltered
trend with a smoothing parameter equal to 1,600 (the results are robust to
using a parameter of 9,600). All data are quarterly, and most samples are
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11. The fact that the results are robust to various changes in the ﬁltering of the data, in-
cluding the use of residuals from a simple model in place of the simple ﬁltered data as de-
scribed in footnote 7, suggests that this assumption is relatively innocuous.
12. The seventeen countries in the housing price sample are Australia, Belgium, Canada,
Denmark, Finland, Greece, Ireland, Israel, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portu-
gal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United States. The twenty-
seven countries in the equity price data sample add Austria, Chile, France, Germany, Italy,
Japan, Korea, Mexico, Peru, and South Africa.from 1970 to 2003.13 To construct the dummy variable dit–k, I ﬁlter the log
equity and housing price data using a Hodrick-Prescott ﬁlter with smooth-
ing parameter equal to 3,200 (again, this is robust to increasing the pa-
rameter value). It is important to note that the use of a two-sided ﬁlter
means that large positive deviations of asset prices from trend—these are
the booms—must be followed by crashes. Put another way, the booms I lo-
cate cannot continue indeﬁnitely.
Finally, taking deviations from country-speciﬁc (and time-varying)
trends has the advantage in that it removes country-ﬁxed eﬀects. While
there are surely numerous conditions that vary in these countries over the
sample, this is at least a minimum condition for pooling.14
Returning to the results, table 1.1 reports estimates for equation (1). To
read the table, take the example of the last entry in the third column under
housing. That’s the one where the threshold   equals 10 percent, and the
lag k is twelve quarters. For this case, the estimate of b is –1.42 with a
p-value of 0.00. This means that, conditional on seeing a housing boom
that is 10 percent above trend, the mean of the output gap twelve quarters
later is, on average, 1.42 percent. That seems like a big number, and it is pre-
cisely estimated.15
Overall, these results allow a number of conclusions. First, in the near
term, at horizons of four quarters, both equity and housing booms lead to
positive output gaps. This is for the simple reason that at a four-quarter
horizon, an asset-market boom is likely to continue, adding fuel to the gen-
eral economic growth. Second, housing booms create future declines in
output and increases in prices while equity booms do not. And third, the
bigger the housing boom, the bigger the expected drop in output and the
expected increase in the price level.
1.3.2 Volatility
Next, I examine the impact of asset price booms on the volatility of out-
put and price deviation from trend. To do this, I regress the square of the
gap, that is (xit)2 on the dummy variable dit–k( ). That is,
(2) (xit)2   a  b dit–k( )    it.
To simplify interpretation, I standardize the data, dividing by the vari-
ance of the entire sample. This means that the coeﬃcient is a measure of
the percentage increase in the volatility. So, for example, a number like 5.28
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13. While it would be interesting to look at shorter samples, there is simply not enough data
to do it.
14. As in section 1.2, the results in section 1.3 are robust to use of residuals from a fourth-
order autoregression and to use of residuals from a model that includes interest rates and ex-
ternal prices.
15. To address problems of heteroskedasiticity (throughout) and serial correlation (within
each country), I have estimated the standard errors and resulting p-values using a panel ver-
sion the Newey-West (Newey and West 1987) procedure with lags equal to 1.5k.(that’s the estimate for a 10 percent housing price boom at a horizon of four
quarters) means a 5.28 percent increase in volatility. The results are re-
ported in table 1.2, and they are quite stark. Housing booms increase the
volatility of growth at all horizons, and that’s it. Interestingly, neither hous-
ing nor equity booms have a measurable impact on the volatility of prices.
And equity booms do not aﬀect the volatility of growth—the estimates are
both economically tiny and statistically irrelevant.
Focusing on the bottom-left panel of the table 1.2—the impact of hous-
ing booms on GDP volatility—we see that the bigger the boom, the bigger
the impact on volatility. But the bigger impact is at short horizons where we
know from table 1.1 that, on average, growth rises. So, while housing
booms increase volatility, it seems to do it primarily on the upside.
1.3.3 GDP and Price Level at Risk
Next, I turn to an examination of the tails of the distribution of output
and price-level outcomes, conditional on asset price booms. Are GDP at
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Table 1.1 Impact of asset price booms on the levels (lag of asset price [k])
Level of the output gap Price level
Threshold ( ) 481 248 1 2
Equity
Data 0.03 0.01 0.00 –0.07 0.00 0.04
1.00 0.96 0.25 0.03 0.50 0.92
4 1.05 0.28 –0.21 –0.61 0.10 0.99
1.00 0.99 0.10 0.30 0.58 0.94
12 0.92 0.32 –0.15 0.04 0.54 1.32
1.00 0.99 0.23 0.51 0.71 0.92
20 0.85 0.16 –0.07 –0.65 0.71 1.58
1.00 0.81 0.38 0.39 0.69 0.88
Housing
Data 0.06 –0.04 –0.09 0.04 0.08 0.07
1.00 0.00 0.00 0.99 1.00 1.00
2 0.46 –0.53 –0.92 0.62 0.96 0.70
1.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
6 0.85 –0.50 –1.28 0.55 1.14 0.95
1.00 0.01 0.00 0.98 1.00 1.00
10 1.10 –0.42 –1.42 0.52 1.19 1.04
1.00 0.12 0.00 0.92 1.00 1.00
Notes: Table 1.1 reports the coeﬃcient b in the regression xit   a   bdit–k( )   εit, where x is
the deviation of either log GDP or the log price from a Hodrick-Prescott ﬁltered trend, with
parameter 1,600; and d is either a dummy variable equal to 1 if the ﬁltered asset price exceeds
the threshold (in percent), or the ﬁltered asset price data itself. In each case, the ﬁrst row of
numbers is the coeﬃcient itself, while the second row is a p-value for the test that b is strictly
less than 0, computed using Newey-West standard errors with lags equal to 1.5 times k. Ital-
icized values are signiﬁcantly greater than 0, while bold values are signiﬁcantly less than 0,
both at the 5 percent level. Samples are described in the data appendix.risk and price level at risk aﬀected by the equity or housing booms or busts?
If, for example, there is a dramatic increase in equity prices, should this
change our view of the possibility of bad events? And, importantly, are
normal approximations likely to give the wrong signal?
Equity Bubbles
For equity booms, the answer to this question is reported in ﬁgure 1.3.
The horizontal axis in the ﬁgure plots the minimum size of the equity price
deviation, and the vertical axis plots the 5th percentile of the distribution
of future outcomes for the GDP gap—the 5 percent GDP at risk. The two
lines show the 5 percent GDP at risk four quarters ahead and twelve quar-
ters ahead. So, for example, if equity prices are at least 10 percent above
trend, the 5th percentile of the distribution of the GDP gap twelve quarters
into the future is –3.6. As it turns out, this is only slight below the 5th per-
centile of the unconditional distribution for deviations of GDP from trend,
which is 3.44, so it isn’t very troubling. In other words, the GDP at risk from
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Table 1.2 Impact of asset price booms on volatility (lag of asset price [k])
Volatility of the output gap Price level volatility
Threshold ( ) 4 81 2 4 81 2
Equity
Data 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
0.14 0.07 0.30 0.38 0.08 0.18
4 0.03 0.33 0.24 0.00 0.00 0.00
0.43 0.08 0.14 0.15 0.54 0.46
12 0.15 0.05 0.19 0.00 0.00 0.00
0.26 0.41 0.15 0.13 0.13 0.12
20 0.39 0.20 0.11 0.00 0.00 0.01
0.12 0.27 0.34 0.16 0.11 0.06
Housing
Data 0.22 0.12 0.05 –0.02 0.00 0.02
0.04 0.18 0.35 0.64 0.53 0.34
2 2.46 2.84 1.43 –0.09 0.50 0.66
0.02 0.01 0.12 0.57 0.12 0.17
6 4.39 4.75 1.93 0.55 0.60 0.87
0.01 0.01 0.12 0.18 0.10 0.16
10 5.48 2.46 5.28 0.88 0.38 0.80
0.04 0.07 0.04 0.16 0.23 0.19
Notes: Table 1.2 reports the coeﬃcient b2 in the regression (xit)2   a2   b2 dit–k( )    it, where
x is the deviation of either log GDP or the log price from a Hodrick-Prescott ﬁltered trend,
with parameter 1,600; and d is either a dummy variable equal to 1 if the ﬁltered asset price ex-
ceeds the threshold   (in percent), or the ﬁltered asset price data itself (those are the rows la-
beled “data”). In each case, the ﬁrst row of numbers is the coeﬃcient itself, while the second
row is a p-value for the test that b2is strictly greater than 0, computed using Newey-West stan-
dard errors with lags equal to 1.5 times k. Bold values are signiﬁcantly greater than 1 at the 5
percent level.a 10 percent equity boom is only very slightly below the unconditional
GDP at risk. The upper line in the ﬁgure, the 5 percent GDP at risk four
quarters ahead, is always signiﬁcantly above the unconditional 5th per-
centile of the GDP gap distribution. The reason for this is that all booms
are likely to continue, so the horizon for the collapse of equity prices and
GDP both is beyond four quarters.
Figure 1.4 reports the results for price level at risk following an equity
boom. The price level at risk results diﬀer quite a bit from the GDP at risk
results. Since some central banks will care about prices rising while others
may care more about prices falling, I report the risk results for both tails of
the distribution. These are referred to as the 95 percent price level at risk.
As the equity boom grows, the risk of the price level falling below trend
(shown in panel A of ﬁgure 1.4) grows substantially. When real equity
prices are 15 percent or more above trend, the 5th percentile of the distri-
bution of price-level gap four quarters out is more than –9 percent. De-
pending on the current level of inﬂation, that could be a signiﬁcant risk. By
contrast, the risk of the extreme positive price-level gaps (in panel B of ﬁg-
ure 1.4) goes down. Conditional on an equity boom, the distribution of
price-level deviations from trend shifts down.
Housing Bubbles
Turning to housing bubbles, ﬁgures 1.5 and 1.6 report computations
analogous to those reported in ﬁgure 1.3 and 1.4. The results in these two
ﬁgures suggest that housing booms are followed by an increased risk of a
large decline in GDP in four to twelve quarters and a decreased risk of
prices falling below trend. Note from the scale that the GDP at risk is quite
large. When real house prices are 5 percent or more above trend, there is a
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Fig. 1.3 GDP at risk following an equity boom5 percent probability that twelve quarters later GDP will be at least 3.44
percent below trend—substantially below the unconditional 5th per-
centile of 2.86 percent.16
Housing booms aﬀect the price level at risk as well. The information in
ﬁgure 1.6 suggests that a housing boom has very little impact on the upper
tail of the price-level distribution, but dramatically eliminates the lower
tail—at least at a twelve-quarter horizon. Unconditionally, the upper tail
5 percent price level at risk twelve quarters following a 10 percent housing
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16. Note that because the countries in the sample diﬀer, the unconditional distributions for
the price-level and GDP gaps are diﬀerent between the equity and housing booms.
Fig. 1.4 Price level at risk following an equity boom: A, Risk of prices falling sig-
niﬁcantly below trend; B, Risk of prices rising signiﬁcantly above trend
A
Bprice boom is roughly one-quarter the unconditional 5th percentile—that
is, it—1 percent as compared with –4 percent.
Comparing the Normal Approximation and the Empirical Density
It is important to ask whether there is any diﬀerence between the results
in ﬁgures 1.3 and 1.5 and those from a simple normal approximation. That
is, if a central banker had been looking at the –1.645 times the standard de-
viation of the distribution of output and price-level gaps, conditional on an
equity market boom, would they have done anything diﬀerently? The re-
sults suggest that the answer to this is yes.
Figure 1.7compares the 5th percentile for the GDP gap computed using
a normal approximation with one from the empirical density. For equity
booms, the normal approximation gives an overly pessimistic view of the
size of the lower tail. The average distance between the two estimates of the
5th percentile of the distribution is roughly three-quarters of 1 percentage
point. This particular example suggests that a policymaker using a quad-
ratic loss would likely overestimate the importance of an equity boom.
Housing is another story. Here the normal distribution gives an overly
optimistic view of the true size of the lower tail. The 5th percentile of the
empirical density is, on average, 1.25 percentage points below what is im-
plied by the normal approximation. Because the probability of extreme
negative outcomes for the GDP gap is higher than suggested by a Gauss-
ian distribution, policymakers focusing on quadratic loss will underesti-
mate the importance of a housing boom.
In the case of price-level outcomes, normal approximations are also mis-
leading. For example, twelve quarters following a housing boom, the 5th
percentile of the upper tail of outcomes is 2.5 percentage points smaller
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Fig. 1.5 GDP at risk following a housing boomFig. 1.6 Price level at risk following a housing boom: A, Risk of prices falling sig-
niﬁcantly below trend; B, Risk of prices rising signiﬁcantly above trend
than would be implied by simply multiplying the standard deviation of the
observed outcomes by 1.64.
1.3.4. Expected Lower Tail Loss
Direct statistical inference for a number like GDP at risk is diﬃcult.17In-
stead of constructing Monte Carlo experiments that might allow conﬁ-
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B
17. Quantile regression, pioneered by Koenker (2005), is an alternative to the ﬁgures in sec-
tion 1.3.3 and the regressions in section 1.3.4. Rather sorting the data based on arbitrarily
chosen thresholds for the right-hand-side variables, quantile regression examines changes in
the relationship based on the quantile of the regression residuals. Such a technique has the
distinct advantage of allowing for the additional control variable in the regression. Future re-
search will examine the robustness of these results to these alternative statistical methods.dence interval estimation, I turn to the examination of the ETL. This is the
expected value, conditional on being in the tail of the distribution. As in the
case of the GDP at risk and price level at risk, here I ask whether the ETL
changes when asset prices boom. In order to do inference, I run a regres-
sion similar to equation (1):
(3) xit   a   b0dit–k( )   b1tail( )it   b3 dit–k( )xtail( )it    it,
where xit is the output or price-level gap; dit–k( ) is a dummy variable equal
to 1 if k periods earlier the ﬁltered asset price data exceeds the threshold  ;
and tail( )it is a dummy variable that equals 1 if xit is in the   percent lower
tail of the distribution of all xit.
The coeﬃcient b3 on the interaction term in equation (3) provides an 
estimate of the impact of an asset price boom of size   on the ETL in the
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A
Fig. 1.7 Comparing the normal approximation with the empirical density GDP at
risk at   twelve quarter horizon: A, Conditional on an equity boom; B, Conditional
on a housing boom
Blowest   percent of the distribution of the output or price-level gap. Be-
cause of the structure of the regression, it is possible to compute standard
errors that are robust to both serial correlation and heteroskedasiticity in
the error term  it.18
The results of this regression are reported in table 1.3, and they are quite
striking. Asset price booms—both equity and housing—result in a fall in
the expected lower tail loss. The decline is both economically and statisti-
cally signiﬁcant. Put another way, equity and housing booms make it more
likely that something bad will happen.
1.3.5 Summary of the Results
Table 1.4 summarizes the results of this section. The conclusion is that
housing booms dramatically change the distribution of outcomes in virtu-
ally every way. By contrast, equity booms have little impact on the mean
and variance of deviation from trend, but do aﬀect the lower tail of the dis-
tribution.
1.4 The Diﬀerence between Equity and Housing Bubbles
To understand the diﬀerential impact of equity and housing bubbles, it
is useful to focus on their consumption eﬀects. Booms in either equity or
property prices drive up the wealth of individuals. The natural response to
an increase in wealth is to raise consumption. If you are rich, you can buy
a fancy car, purchase a bigger and ﬂatter television, go on nicer vacations,
eat in expensive restaurants, and the like. And the data show that this is ex-
actly what happens.
A useful rule of thumb is that a $1 increase in U.S. wealth generates be-
tween two and ﬁve cents of additional consumption by American house-
holds.19 That is, the marginal propensity to consume for wealth is in the
range of 0.02 to 0.05.
As Norman, Sebastia-Barriel, and Weeken (2002) note, the marginal
propensity to consume is of somewhat less interest than the elasticity of
consumption with respect to wealth.20 They emphasize that we care more
about the impact of a 10 percent increase in the value of wealth than we do
about the number of cents or pence that consumption rises per dollar or
pound of additional wealth. This is especially true of equity wealth be-
cause the size of equity markets vary so widely across countries. Bertaut
(2002) reports that, at the end of 2001, total equity market capitalization
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18. The estimation method is an adaptation of the Newey-West estimator to a panel in
which there is serial correlation and heteroskedasiticity within a country, but no dependence
between countries.
19. See, for example, Norman, Sebastia-Barriel, and Weeken (2002).
20. The elasticity of consumption with respect to wealth is equal to the marginal propen-
sity to consume out of wealth times the ratio of wealth to consumption.equaled 153 percent of GDP in the United Kingdom, but only 59 percent
of GDP in Germany. To understand the importance of this, consider the
impact of a 10 percent increase in equity prices on consumption in each
country, assuming that the marginal propensity to consume is the same.
The estimated impact in the United Kingdom the impact would be roughly
three times as large as that in Germany.21
This highlights the importance of thinking about bubbles in housing and
equity prices separately. There are two reasons for this. First, equity prices
are substantially more volatile than housing prices, so the former is much
less likely to be permanent than the latter. Reasonably, households respond
more aggressively to changes in wealth that they perceive to be perma-
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21. Careful econometric estimates show an even larger disparity. Bertuat (2002) reports that
10 percent increase in stock market creates 0.5 to 1.0 percent increase in consumption in the
long run in the United States and United Kingdom, but only 0.07 in Germany where the eq-
uity is less than 60 percent of GDP.
Table 1.3  Impact of asset price booms on the lowest quartile (lag of asset price [k])
Output gap Price-level gap
Threshold ( ) 4 8 12 4 8 12
Equity
Data –0.03 –0.02 0.01 –0.26 –0.21 0.03
0.10 0.12 0.63 0.02 0.06 0.59
4 –3.81 –2.50 –1.87 –14.05 –16.12 –13.88
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
12 –4.63 –1.75 –1.70 –16.38 –19.20 –16.35
0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00
20 –5.37 –2.05 –0.85 –18.06 –20.73 –17.36
0.00 0.02 0.05 0.00 0.00 0.00
Housing
Data –0.01 –0.03 –0.01 0.06 0.10 0.09
0.35 0.11 0.35 0.67 0.84 0.76
2 –1.53 –1.08 –0.69 –2.47 –4.03 –5.01
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01
6 –1.42 –1.15 –0.28 –2.89 –4.83 –9.22
0.00 0.00 0.18 0.00 0.00 0.00
10 –1.16 –0.34 –0.59 –3.28 –3.91 –12.29
0.00 0.12 0.08 0.00 0.00 0.00
Notes: Table 1.3 reports the coeﬃcient b3 in the regression xit   a   b1dit–k( )   b2tail( )it  
b3dit–k( )x tailit( )   υit, where xit is the deviation of either log GDP or the log price from a
Hodrick-Prescott ﬁltered trend, with parameter 1,600; tailit( ) is a dummy variable that
equals 1 if xit in the lower  -percent tail; and d is either a dummy variable equal to 1 if the ﬁl-
tered asset price exceeds the threshold   (in percent), or the ﬁltered asset price data itself
(those are the rows labeled “data”). In each case, the ﬁrst row of numbers is the coeﬃcient it-
self, while the second row is a p-value for the test that b3 (the coeﬃcient on the interaction
term) is strictly less than 0, computed using Newey-West standard errors with lags equal to
1.5 times k. Bold values are signiﬁcantly greater than 1 at the 5 percent level.nent.22 Second, equity ownership tends to be concentrated among the
wealthy—people who are much less likely to adjust their consumption lev-
els. Housing ownership, by contrast, is distributed more broadly. And
while the quality of housing and the concentration of ownership vary
across countries, the diﬀerences are far less dramatic.
Returning to the evidence, using data from fourteen developed coun-
tries, Case, Quigley, and Shiller (2005) discuss how a 1 percent increase in
housing wealth raises consumption by between 0.11 and 0.17 percent. By
contrast, they ﬁnd that the stock market wealth elasticity of consumption
is substantially smaller, only 0.02. It is natural that the housing booms
would have more of an impact on the distribution of macroeconomic out-
comes than equity booms do.
1.5 Policy Responses: Risk Management and Financial Structure
Is there anything to be done about all of this? Can we provide any useful
guidance on how to avoid the risks bubbles pose? Researchers have inves-
tigated myriad possible responses, including, but not restricted to, reacting
only to bubbles insofar as they inﬂuence inﬂation forecasts; reacting only
to the fallout of a bubble after it bursts; leaning against a bubble as it 
develops; including asset prices in the price index central bankers target;
and examining various regulator solutions involving margin and lending
requirements. In Cecchetti (2006), I summarize the traditional debate in
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22. Kishor (2005) estimates that while 98 percent of the change in housing wealth is per-
manent, only 55 percent of the change in ﬁnancial wealth is. This suggests that the housing
wealth eﬀect should be roughly twice the stock market wealth eﬀect.
Table 1.4  Summary of the impact of asset price booms on the distribution of
macroeconomic outcomes (lag of asset price)
Output gap Price-level gap
Moment k 4 k 12 k 4 k 12
Equity
Mean Higher None None None
Variance None None None None
5% VaR Better None None Worse
25% Expected Tail Loss Lower Lower Lower Lower
Housing
Mean Higher Lower Higher Higher
Variance Higher Higher None None
5% VaR Better Worse Better None
25% Expected Tail Loss Lower Lower Lower Lower
Note: Table 1.4 summarizes the results in tables 1.1, 1.2, and 1.3 and ﬁgures 1.3 to 1.6.each of these cases. Brieﬂy, there is a consensus building against the purely
activist view. As Gruen, Plumb, and Stone (2005) discuss, the information
requirements for the activism are fairly high, and thereare signiﬁcant risks
of costly missteps. The conclusion is that interest rates should play only a
modest role in combating the destabilizing eﬀects of asset price bubbles
From a risk management perspective, the discussion of central bank re-
sponses to asset price bubbles is unnecessarily restrictive. Why focus only
on traditional monetary policy tools? Risk managers do more than simply
monitor and react to developments; they build institutional structures
that are unlikely to collapse when hit by large shocks. The regulators 
and supervisors of the ﬁnancial system have built mechanisms exactly like
this. Are there similar responses to bubbles? When subjected to equity and
property price bubbles, are some ﬁnancial systems more resilient than
others?
Recent work by Dynan, Elmendorf and Sichel (2006) and Cecchetti,
Flores-Lagunes, and Krause (2006) suggests that changes in the ﬁnancial
system have been an important source of stabilization over the past several
decades. Their results suggest that enhanced household access to credit al-
lows for increased consumption smoothing that has been a major factor in
reducing the volatility of aggregate real growth.23 This brings up the natu-
ral question: does the impact of housing and equity bubbles on GDP at risk
or price level at risk depend on ﬁnancial structure?
To examine this, I begin with data on ﬁnancial structure taken from
Demirguc-Kunt and Levine (2001). Brieﬂy, Demirguc-Kunt and Levine
have constructed a data set on ﬁnancial indicators during the 1990s cover-
ing a broad cross section of countries. Included are measures of the relative
size of a country’s stock market and banking sector, as well as a measure of
the relative eﬃciency of the two. Countries with “market-based ﬁnancial
systems” are those with bigger more eﬃcient stock markets. I examine the
relationship of this composite ﬁnancial structure index and the behavior of
an economy following booms in equity or housing prices.
As a ﬁrst step, I reproduce ﬁgures 1.3 and 1.5 with the data for GDP at
risk dividing the data based on whether it comes from a country with a pre-
dominantly market-based or bank-based ﬁnancial system. The results, re-
ported in ﬁgure 1.8, show that for countries where equity markets are im-
portant, equity booms increase GDP at risk. By contrast, GDP at risk
following a housing boom is not sensitive to ﬁnancial structure as charac-
terized by this index.
To examine this a bit further, and to try to get a grasp on whether any of
it is precise in a statistical sense, I add the ﬁnancial structure variable to re-
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23. The argument is that there is a linkage not only between ﬁnancial system development
and the level of real growth, as described in Ross Levine’s (1997) survey, but also between ﬁ-
nancial development and the stability of real growth.gressions (1), (2) and (3)—both as a level and interacted with the asset price
boom dummy. Here’s an example:
(1 ) xit   a   bdit–k( )   cfi   dfidit–k( )   εit,
(2 )( xit)2   a  b dit–k( )   c fi   d fidit–k( )    it.
(3 ) xit   a   b0dit–k( )   b1tail( )it   b3dit–k( )xtail( )it
b4 fi   b5 fidit–k( )   b6 fitail( )it   b7 fidit–k( )xtail( )it    it,
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Fig. 1.8 Market- versus bank-based ﬁnancial systems GDP at risk at   twelve
quarter horizon: A, Equity booms; B, Housing booms
A
Bwhere fi is the composite structure index from the CD-ROM that is dis-
tributed with Demirguc-Kunt and Levine (2001).24
Table 1.5 reports the estimated coeﬃcients on the interactions terms in
each of these: fidit–k( ) in equations (1 ) and (2 ), and fidit–k( )x tail( )it in
equation (3 ). These tell us whether diﬀerences in ﬁnancial structure
change the impact of an asset price boom on the mean, variance, or lower
tail events in the distribution of the output gap. I report the results for a lag
of four and twelve quarters. The ﬁnancial structure index is positive for
market-based economies and negative for bank-based ones. For example,
it takes on a value of  0.17 for the United States and –0.18 for Greece.
Unsurprisingly, the strongest results are those for the mean. In countries
with market-based ﬁnancial systems, which is to say places where equity
markets are important, the ﬁrst and second column of the top panel in table
1.5 shows that equity price increases lead to bigger short-horizon booms
and bigger long-horizon crashes (although the latter are imprecisely es-
timated). Analogously, for bank-based economies, housing booms lead 
to bigger short-horizon GDP booms, but smaller long-horizon crashes.
(These are the results in the ﬁrst and second column of the bottom panel of
the table.)
Turning to the volatility, there is no measurable impact on ﬁnancial
structure. The point estimates reported in the fourth and ﬁfth columns of
table 1.5 are all small and the p-values are never below 0.2 or above 0.8.
Finally, looking at the far right columns of table 1.5, the results from es-
timating equation (3 ), there is some weak evidence that market-based
economies fare somewhat worse at longer horizons when hit with equity
price booms. Again, this is really no surprise.
In the end, these results are disappointing. While we may believe that ﬁ-
nancial structure plays role in the real economic impact of asset price
booms, the data available do not show much evidence of it.
1.6 Conclusion
Stability is the watchword for central bankers. Listen to most modern
monetary policymakers speak about their goals, and you are likely to hear
about the desire for low, stable inﬂation and high, stable growth. They will
explain how they raise and lower their short-term interest rate target in or-
der to meet their stability-oriented objectives. But listen closely, and you
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24. The index average of deviations from the mean of (1) stock market capitalization di-
vided by deposit money bank assets (relative size of stock market compared to banking sec-
tor), (2) total value traded in stock market divided by claims on private sector by deposit
money banks (relative activity of stock market compared to banking sector), and (3) total
value traded in stock market as a share of GDP divided by banking overhead costs as a share
of total assets (relative eﬃciency of stock market compared to banking sector). The actual
data are column EQ in the ﬁle called “request8095.xls.” These data are the same as those.will realize that the statements are more nuanced. While stability is the ul-
timate objective, it is the possibility of catastrophe that keeps central
bankers awake at night. They want to ensure that nothing really bad hap-
pens, and to do this, they are looking at the entire distribution of possible
outcomes.
In analyzing the macroeconomic impact of asset price booms and
crashes, it is the disasters that are the true concern. This suggests a diﬀer-
ent approach to risk, one based on keeping the probability of output devi-
ating from its trend (or price level deviations from its target trend) over
some time horizon below some ﬁxed threshold. Policy responses should be
built in order to keep the lower tail of the distribution—as measured by
value-at-risk or the ETL—suﬃciently small.
In this chapter, I use data from a broad cross section of countries to ex-
Measuring the Macroeconomic Risks Posed by Asset Price Booms 31
Table 1.5  Financial structure and the impact of asset price booms (lag of asset price
in quarters)
Mean Variance Lowest Quartile
Threshold ( ) 41 241 241 2
Equity
Data 0.07 –0.03 0.00 0.00 0.06 –0.07
1.00 0.15 0.62 0.32 0.84 0.10
8 1.50 –0.60 0.01 –0.01 1.41 –1.20
0.95 0.31 0.31 0.65 0.69 0.25
16 2.31 –0.87 0.01 0.00 3.68 –2.03
0.97 0.26 0.30 0.45 0.74 0.11
20 2.88 –1.82 0.00 0.02 5.25 –3.57
0.98 0.12 0.42 0.19 0.78 0.06
Housing
41 2 41 2 41 2
Data –0.14 –0.04 0.00 0.00 –0.02 0.05
0.07 0.36 0.65 0.54 0.44 0.64
4 –1.40 –1.60 0.03 –0.03 –1.06 0.59
0.16 0.14 0.37 0.63 0.21 0.65
8 –1.90 –0.02 –0.09 –0.03 –0.50 0.19
0.21 0.50 0.71 0.59 0.40 0.54
10 –0.83 0.04 –0.20 –0.04 –0.10 0.89
0.38 0.51 0.77 0.58 0.49 0.61
Notes: Table 1.5 reports the regression coeﬃcients from the interaction of the ﬁnancial struc-
ture measure with the asset price boom dummy variable in equations (1 ), (2 ), and (3 ). The
more positive ﬁnancial structure, the more market-based a country’s ﬁnancial system; the
more negative, the more bank-based it is. In each case, the ﬁrst row of numbers is the coeﬃ-
cient itself, while the second row is a p-value for the test that is strictly less than zero, com-
puted using Newey-West standard errors with lags equal to 1.5 times k. Italicized values are
signiﬁcantly greater than zero at the 5 percent level and boldfaced values are signiﬁcantly less
than zero at the 10 percent level.amine the mean, variance, and lower tail risks arising from booms and
crashes in equity and housing markets. The conclusion is that housing
bubbles change the entire distribution of macroeconomic outcomes. By
contrast, equity bubbles tend to make the worst events even worse, leaving
the mean and variance of the distributions roughly unchanged. The strong
conclusion is that approximations that use the normal distribution, and
analyses based on quadratic loss functions, have the potential to be ex-
tremely misleading. Looking further, I present weak evidence suggesting
that those countries with market-based ﬁnancial systems, where stock
market capitalization is relatively large, weather housing booms somewhat
better and equity booms somewhat worse than countries with bank-based
ﬁnancial systems.
In closing, it is important to emphasize one critical implication of adopt-
ing a risk management view. As mentioned earlier, econometric modeling
tends to provide characterizations of what happens near the mean of the
data. In fact, in order to improve the quality of estimates, researchers have
a tendency to remove outliers. This is sometimes done in the guise of sen-
sitivity analysis and other times using limited-inﬂuence estimation that ex-
plicitly truncates tail observations. This means that standard modeling
strategies provide virtually no information about the behavior of the econ-
omy when it is under stress. As a result, evaluating the problems posed by
extreme events, which is at the core of risk management, necessarily re-
quires judgment. And to quote Chairman Greenspan (2004) one ﬁnal time:
“Such judgments, by their nature, are based on bits and pieces of history




Price data computed for consumer price inﬂation data was obtained
from the International Financial Statisticsonline and the OECD Economic
Outlook no. 76, December 2004.
GDP
Gross domestic product data was obtained from the International Fi-
nancial Statistics CD-ROM (December 2004) and the OECD Economic
Outlook no. 76, December 2004.
Equity Prices
Equity prices are from the International Financial Statistics online.
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Data for Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, Ireland, the
Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United
Kingdom, and United States are all from the BIS. Data for Hong Kong are
from the Hong Kong Monetary Authority, Census and Statistics Depart-
ment, Monthly Digest of Statistics, table 5.9, column (6). Data for Israel
are from the Israel Central Bureau of Statistics, online. Data for Japan are
from Goldman Sachs. Data for New Zealand are from the Reserve Bank of
New Zealand.
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Comment Andrew Levin
This chapter addresses a crucial topic for monetary policymakers, namely,
does an asset price boom substantially raise the likelihood of a subsequent
macroeconomic crisis? In this context, the chapter introduces the terms
gross domestic product (GDP) at risk and price level at risk to characterize
the lower tail of the distribution of each variable and then seeks to quantify
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resenting the views of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System nor of anyone
else associated with the Federal Reserve System.the extent to which these risks are exacerbated by booms in either equity
prices or house prices. While it would be ideal if one could consider the mar-
ginal impact on truly extreme events (such as the U.S. Great Depression of
the 1930s), broad indexes of asset prices are only available for a substantial
cross section of industrial economies over the post-1970 period; thus, the
results reported here reﬂect the incidence and severity of the various reces-
sions that actually occurred within the sample. Despite these statistical
challenges, the chapter obtains signiﬁcant evidence that a boom in house
prices is associated with a subsequent reduction in real economic activity.
Measuring GDP at Risk
The analysis of the chapter begins by presenting evidence that output
ﬂuctuations exhibit a heavy lower tail, similar to the distribution com-
monly observed for equity prices. In particular, for eleven of the seventeen
countries under consideration, the Jarque-Bera (J-B) test rejects the null
hypothesis of a Gaussian distribution at a conﬁdence level of 95 percent,
and density approximations based on a t-distribution imply a distinctly
larger magnitude of output contractions at the bottom 5th percentile of the
distribution. Nevertheless, several important issues should be considered
in interpreting these results.
Positive versus Negative Outliers
The J-B test is designed to detect skewness or excess kurtosis but does
not necessarily indicate a heavy lower tail of the distribution. Indeed, as
shown by the histograms in ﬁgure 1C.1 of this comment, positive outliers
account for six cases in which the J-B test rejects the Gaussian null hy-
pothesis. These outliers are concentrated in the early 1970s for four coun-
tries (namely, Italy, Japan, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom), while
the Finnish outliers are associated with the 1989 to 1990 boom, and the
German outliers correspond to the postreuniﬁcation period of 1991 to
1992. The incidence of positive outliers also underscores the challenges in
constructing measures of the output gap in the absence of any structural
model; for example, a sequence of positive outliers in Hodrick-Prescott
(HP)-detrended GDP could reﬂect either a cyclical boom or a spurt in po-
tential output.
Transitory versus Persistent Outliers
Figure 1C.2 of this comment depicts histograms for the remaining ﬁve
countries for which the J-B test rejects the null hypothesis of a Gaussian
distribution for detrended output. Even in these cases, it is important to
distinguish instances of deep recession—that is, lasting several quarters or
more—from transitory ﬂuctuations that might reﬂect a brief period of 
political turmoil or natural disaster. For example, the two outliers for 
Measuring the Macroeconomic Risks Posed by Asset Price Booms 35Australia reﬂect a single sharp recession that lasted from late 1982 through
the end of 1983, whereas the data for Greece contains a single isolated out-
lier in the third quarter of 1974. The detrended output series for New
Zealand also exhibits transitory outliers—both positive and negative—
during 1973 to 1974, presumably reﬂecting the impact of highly volatile
commodity prices. By contrast, the Netherlands’s output trajectory has
been remarkably stable over the past three decades, with a standard devia-
tion of only 1.25 percent; in this case, one negative “outlier” reﬂects a
single period in 1979, while the other two occurred during a more persis-
tent contraction (lasting about a year) in 1982 to 1983. Finally, the cluster
of negative outliers in the U.S. data correspond to the recession of 1981 to
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Fig. 1C.1 Positive versus negative outliers in detrended output
Note: For each country, the x-axis indicates the range of values of the HP-detrended output
gap over the period 1970Q1 to 2003Q4, while the y-axis indicates the relative frequency of
outcomes.1983, which continues to be the largest contraction in U.S. economic ac-
tivity since the Great Depression of the 1930s.
The Impact of House Price Booms
The chapter obtains substantial evidence that house price booms—mea-
sured by the deviation of each country’s aggregate house price index from
its HP-ﬁltered trend—are associated with subsequent reductions in real
economic activity. To shed further light on these results, it is helpful to fo-
cus on the speciﬁcation that yields the highest level of statistical signiﬁ-
cance, namely, the extent to which a house price boom of at least 10 per-
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Fig. 1C.2 Transitory versus persistent outliers in detrended output
Note: For each country, the x-axis indicates the range of values of the HP-detrended output
gap over the period 1970Q1 to 2003Q4, while the y-axis indicates the relative frequency of
outcomes.centage points is associated with a substantial decline in the HP-detrended
output gap twelve quarters later. The panel data set contains 103 observa-
tions (encompassing thirteen of the seventeen countries for which the rele-
vant data is available) that satisfy this threshold for a house price boom,
while the remaining control group of nearly 1,600 observations can be used
to compute the distribution of output gaps that are notpreceded by a house
price boom at a twelve-quarter horizon.
Summary statistics regarding the distribution of output gaps—condi-
tional on either the presence or absence of a house price boom twelve quar-
ters earlier—are reported in table 1C.1 of this comment. Evidently, the oc-
currence of a house price boom systematically reduces the subsequent level
of output: the mean of the conditional distribution is shifted downward by
about 1.4 percent, a value that matches the regression estimate reported for
this speciﬁcation in table 1.1 of the chapter. The magnitude of this decline
is also virtually identical to the impact shown in ﬁgure 1.5 of the chapter,
which depicts the bottom 5th percentile of the unconditional distribution
of output gaps in comparison with the same percentile conditional on the
existence of a house price boom twelve quarters earlier.
Nevertheless, these results indicate that house price booms are not asso-
ciated with substantially greater dispersion in the subsequent path of out-
put. In particular, as shown in ﬁgure 1C.3 of this comment, the occurrence
of a boom causes a downward shift in the entire distribution for detrended
output but does not induce a heavier tail of adverse outcomes. This visual
impression is conﬁrmed by the summary statistics in the table: a house
price boom has only modest eﬀects on the standard deviation and the de-
gree of skewness, while the degree of excess kurtosis is not aﬀected at all.
Thus, while house price booms do seem to generate some downside risk for
the subsequent path of output, the magnitude of this risk appears to be
fairly limited, relative to the eﬀects of other macroeconomic disturbances.
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No. of observations 1581 103
Mean 0.1 –1.3
Median 0.1 –1.2
Standard deviation 1.7 1.9
Skewness 0.4 –0.4
Excess Kurtosis 3.2 3.1
Notes: Table 1C.1 reports summary statistics regarding the conditional distribution of
Hodrick-Prescott detrended output gaps for seventeen industrial countries over the period
1970Q1 to 2003Q4. Column (1) provides results for the set of observations that are preceded
by a house-price boom twelve quarters earlier, while column (2) reﬂects all other observations.Simulations of the Federal Reserve Board (FRB)/US Model
While these results reﬂect statistical patterns for a broad panel data set
of industrial economies, simulations of the FRB/US model—which has
been estimated using U.S. aggregate data and is used in ongoing policy
analysis at the Federal Reserve Board—yield very similar implications re-
garding the macroeconomic eﬀects of a sharp drop in house prices.1For ex-
ample, ﬁgure 1C.4 of this comment depicts a scenario in which the aggre-
gate house price index falls 10 percent during the second half of 2006 and
by an additional 5 percent during 2007. As a result, U.S. real GDP declines
to about 0.75 percent below baseline by the end of 2008.2 The shaded re-
gions in the ﬁgure indicate 70 and 90 percent conﬁdence intervals obtained
from stochastic simulations of the model, with shocks drawn from the set
of estimated residuals over the period 1988 to 2004; these conﬁdence in-
tervals highlight the extent to which the model implies that even a steep
drop in U.S. house prices would only have modest consequences for real
GDP, at least in the absence of any other major disturbances.
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1. See Brayton et al. (1997) for an overview of the speciﬁcation and empirical properties of
the FRB/US model.
2. Although not shown in the ﬁgure, the scenario assumes that movements in the federal
funds rate are determined by Taylor’s rule, which prescribes a gradual reduction to about 100
basis points below baseline by the end of 2008.
Fig. 1C.3 Housing booms and the distribution of output gaps
Note: This ﬁgure depicts the cumulative distribution of HP-detrended output gaps for seven-
teen industrial countries over the period 1970Q1 to 2003Q4. The hollow boxes denote this dis-
tribution for observations that are preceded by a house price boom twelve quarters earlier,
while the solid boxes denote the distribution for all other observations.Real-Time Assessment of House Price Fluctuations
Finally, while the cross-country empirical analysis of this chapter has
been conducted using HP-ﬁltered aggregate house price indixes, it should
be noted that ﬁnancial market indicators may be useful for providing real-
time information about market perceptions regarding the likelihood of a
sharp decline in house prices.3 For example, ﬁgure 1C.5 of this comment
depicts the evolution of KMV-Moody measures of one-year-ahead ex-
pected default probabilities for twelve U.S. homebuilding ﬁrms over the pe-
riod 1990 to 2006; while providing an early signal of downside risks to the
residential construction industry prior to the onset of each of the past two
recessions, this measure has not given any recent indications of a substan-
tial near-term probability of a collapse in the housing market. This outlook
is consistent with recently available information from housing futures and
options, which began trading on the Chicago Mercantile Exchange in late
May 2006 and suggested that market participants were anticipating a
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3. Durham (2006) provides detailed analysis of asset prices related to the U.S. homebuilder
industry along with an overview of Chicago Mercantile Exchange (CME) housing futures
and options, while Campbell et al. (2006) analyze the extent to which recent trends in U.S.
house prices can be interpreted in terms of movements in rents, real interest rates, and risk
premia.
Fig. 1C.4 Simulations of the FRB/US model
Note: This ﬁgure depicts an FRB/US model simulation of a scenario in which the aggregate
house price index declines by 10 percent during the second half of 2006 and an additional 5
percent during 2007; the response of U.S. real GDP (relative to baseline) is indicated by the
solid line, while the shaded regions denote 70 and 90 percent conﬁdence intervals obtained
from stochastic simulations of the model, with shocks drawn from the set of estimated resid-
uals over the period 1988 to 2004.sharp slowing in the growth rate but apparently not a substantial decline in
the level of U.S. house prices over the subsequent few quarters.
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Discussion Summary
Lars E.O. Svensson questioned whether Alan Greenspan’s “risk-
management approach to policy” need be associated with special treat-
ment of extreme events. Svensson suggested that everything Greenspan
had said or written was consistent with Bayesian minimization of an ex-
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Fig. 1C.5 Expected default probabilities in the U.S. residential construction industry
Note: This ﬁgure depicts the quartiles of the distribution of one-year-ahead expected default
probabilities (as estimated by KMV-Moodys) for twelve large publicly traded U.S. ﬁrms in the
residential construction industry.pected loss function. In thinking about low-probability extreme events, 
it was not clear that you should ignore information from the rest of the 
distribution of events. Standard quadratic loss functions, for example, pe-
nalize bad outcomes. In fact, Charles Goodhart had even argued for an
absolute-value loss function on the grounds that quadratic loss penalizes
extreme outcomes too severely. For the same reason, Margaret Bray and
Goodhart had argued for loss functions that are bounded from above.
John Williams said that he did think there was a useful distinction be-
tween risk management and minimizing expected loss and that he thought
that Greenspan had distinguished between the two. He also argued that all
central bankers adopt a risk management approach to some extent and
that this causes econometric problems for the analysis of monetary policy
because their adoption of such an approach means there are not many
sharp economic downturns in the data. Levin suggests that it would be use-
ful to look at periods of greater macroeconomic instability—such as the
1970s—to investigate the extent and causes of policy failures in these situ-
ations.
Jordi Galí asked why the analysis lumped together price run-ups that
were followed by crashes with price run-ups that were not followed by
crashes. He suggested that only the cases with collapses were interesting for
the analysis. Cecchetti answered that he had wanted to condition only on
the information that there was a price run-up. He did not want his analysis
to have to rely on the knowledge that there was a subsequent collapse.
John Y. Campbell pointed out that the Hodrick-Prescott ﬁlter (used in
the chapter to calculate deviations from trend) is two-sided. He suggested
that this meant that the analysis was implicitly conditioning on a collapse
because run-ups that were not followed by a collapse would be attributed
to the trend.
Lars E.O. Svensson asked for clariﬁcation: what sorts of preferences im-
ply an interest in risk management? What are the implications? Does the
avoidance of extreme events act as a constraint, in the sense that the poli-
cymaker should minimize expected loss subject to some gross domestic
product (GDP) at risk or price level at risk constraint? Cecchetti replied
that he considered that he had observed policy actions that were driven by
higher moment considerations. He believed that these actions were ra-
tional but could not be explained by minimization of a quadratic loss func-
tion. Svensson said that his prior was that these were, in fact, driven by
quadratic loss. If not, he wondered whether Cecchetti thought that such ac-
tions were normatively sensible. Cecchetti answered that the central bank
should care about extreme events although it was not clear that adjustment
of interest rates would always be the appropriate policy response.
John Y. Campbell said that he thought that expected tail loss, discussed
in section 1.3.4 of Cecchetti’s chapter, was more relevant for policymakers
than GDP at risk or price level at risk. Gross domestic product at risk is de-
42 Stephen G. Cecchettiﬁned analogously to value at risk (VaR): that is, it speciﬁes the loss that will
be incurred over a given horizon at some chosen percentile of the distribu-
tion of outcomes. It does not consider the distribution of outcomes at still
lower percentiles. Ignoring the distribution of extreme outcomes may
make sense for ﬁnancial institutions that become insolvent if extreme out-
comes occur, but it is not appropriate for central banks conducting mone-
tary policy.
Andrew Levin suggested that the discussion was relevant to the zero
lower bound on nominal rates. Choosing higher inﬂation is like making an
insurance payment against the possibility of hitting the zero lower bound
and entering a liquidity trap. Taking out such insurance might or might not
be worthwhile, depending on the size of the inﬂation cushion needed.
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